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STATE COURT EVASION OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
MANDATES DURING THE LAST DECADE OF THE WARREN
COURT
JERRY K. BEATTY*
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, both federal and state courts must adhere to
the Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, one of the most unique characteristics of our dual judiciary
is the ability of state courts to avoid, delay or evade the mandates of the
Supreme Court. Although several studies have noted this phenomenon,
only a few have made any attempt to be systematic or comprehensive.'
The purpose of this study is to examine the litigation in state courts
subsequent to a remand by the Supreme Court in an effort to determine
the extent to which state courts use their discretion in a manner incon-
sistent with the Court's mandates. Because of the controversial nature of
many rulings of the Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren, the con-
ditions for evasive state court action were particularly ripe during that
era of judicial activism.'
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Simpson College.
1. The most recent systematic study of state court evasion was published nearly
twenty years ago. See Note, Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded
to State Courts Since i941, 67 HARY. L. REV. 1251 (1954). Other investigations of
noncompliance by state courts include: Note, Final Disposition of State Court Decisions
Reversed and Remanded by the Supreme Court, October Term, 1931, to October
Term 1941, 55 HARv. L. REv. 1357 (1942) ; Note, State Court Evasion of United
States Supreme Court Mandates, 56 YALE L.J. 574 (1947). See also S. WASBY, THE
IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES 28-32 (1970);
Balustein & Ferguson, Avoidance, Evasion and Delay, in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS 96 (T. Becker ed. 1969) ; Schmidhauser, The Tenions of Federal-
ism: The Case of Judge Peters, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
36 (J. Schmidhauser ed. 1963); Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court
Power, 53 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 1017 (1959).
2. The declining prestige and popularity of the Warren Court can be demon-
strated by a Gallup Poll taken in 1957 and repeated in 1966. In the 1957 poll, 30
percent of the respondents asserted that they respected the Court more than Congress,
while 29 percent had greater respect for Congress. In the 1966 poll, 25 percent trusted
the Court more, while 34 percent had greater trust in Congress. Dolbeare, The Public
Views the Supreme Court, in LAW, POLITICS, AND THE SUPREME COURT 194, 202 (H.
Jacob ed. 1967); Murphy & Tanenhaus, Constitutional Courts and Political Represen-
tation, in MODERN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: READINGS 541, 551 (M. Danielson & W.
Murphy eds. 1969). Moreover, a 1969 Gallup Poll indicated that 75 percent of the
American public believed the courts had been too lenient with criminal suspects.
See N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1969, at 47, col. 1. See also Dolbeare & Hammond, The
Political Party Basic Attitudes Toward the Supreme Court, 31 PUB. OP. Q. 16 (1967) ;
Hirsch & Donohew, A Note on Negro-White Differences in Attitudes Toward the
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After the United States Supreme Court "reverses" or "vacates" a
judgment and "remands" a case to the state courts, the lower courts
may be asked to clarify the issues, decide upon new issues, rule on the
effect of intervening state legislation or determine the constitutionality of
state laws or state constitutional provisions. Since the Supreme Court
when reviewing a state court case generally confines its decision to
"federal" issues and remands a case to state courts to render final judg-
ment, there are many opportunities for state courts to avoid, mitigate or
nullify the ruling or advice of the Court.' Except when state procedural
grounds impose unreasonable obstacles to the vindication of federal
rights or when such rights are discriminately or inconsistently applied,
the Supreme Court will generally not review state court decisions based
on non-federal grounds.'
Moreover, when the Supreme Court grants certiorari to hear a state
case which has exhausted all lower court remedies and presents a
"substantial federal question," the Court has several options in disposing
of the litigation. It can express a clear mandate and direct the state
courts to render a new judgment "not inconsistent with" the decision of
the Court or, conversely, it might only suggest that the lower courts
give "further consideration" to the case "in light of" a recent Court
Supreme Court, 49 Soc. Sci. Q. 557 (1968) ; Kessel, Public Perceptions of the Supreme
Court, 10 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 167 (1966); Murphy & Tanenhaus, Public Opinion
and the Supreme Court: The Goldwater Campaign, 32 PUB. Op. Q. 31 (1968).
The declining prestige of the Court can also be demonstrated by over a hundred
bills and amendments which were introduced in Congress to nullify the Supreme Court's
Bible reading-prayer decisions. Also, in reaction to the Court's reapportionment
decisions, Senator Dirksen on two occasions obtained majority support in the United
States Senate for a constitutional amendment allowing states to apportion one of their
legislative chambers on a basis other than population.
In 1958, 36 state court justices signed a report highly critical of recent Supreme
Court decisions on state criminal procedures. Only eight chief justices opposed the
report. See Report by the 1958 Conference of State Chief Justices, Harv. L. Rec.
(Spec. ed.) Oct. 23, 1958, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
32 (J. Schmidhauser ed. 1963).
3. For example, state courts may evade the letter or intent of a Supreme Court
mandate by construing the state law to conform with minimal constitutional standards,
by narrowly interpreting the dictum of Supreme Court precedents, by requiring
precisely parallel fact situations, by refusing to logically expand the rulings of the
Supreme Court to closely related areas and by declining to permit an appeal because of
a violation of procedural rules.
4. The doctrine of "adequate state grounds" was articulated nearly one hundred-
years ago in Murdock v. Memphis, 86 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874). For decisions.
prohibiting "unreasonable" or "inconsistent" obstacles in the way of federal sub-
stantive rights see NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) ; Dav'is-
v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923). The "adequate state grounds" doctrine was some-
what modified by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). In Fay, the Supreme Court
ruled that when federal rights are involved, the lower federal courts have the right
to make an independent determination of the question in habeas corpus proceedings
regardless of the adequacy of the state grounds upon which the judgment rested.
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decision mentioned in the remand opinion. Thus, a Supreme Court
mandate may be definite and forthright or limited, equivocal and
ambiguous.
In the decade from October, 1959, through June, 1969, the United
States Supreme Court issued decisions on 560 state cases from 42 state
courts of last resort.5 Of these cases, 41 were affirmed by the Court,
182 were reversed, 133 were reversed and remanded and 204 were vacated
and remanded. Analysis of the 337 cases which were either "reversed
and remanded" or "vacated and remanded" during the last decade of
the Warren Court indicates that in 199 or 46.3 percent of these cases,
further litigation occurred in state courts following the Supreme Court
remand.' Interestingly, in 27.1 percent of these cases having further
litigation (54 of 199 cases), the party victorious in the Supreme Court
was unsuccessful in the state courts following the remand." Of course,
this in itself is not indicative of deliberate evasion of Supreme Court
mandates or violation of federal constitutional rights. As mentioned
above, many cases are reversed by the Supreme Court because the state
court failed to provide a fair trial, refused to rule on constitutional
issues raised or was ambiguous in its judicial interpretation. Frequently,
the Supreme Court will remand a case to the state courts for a new trial
on the merits. Moreover, the issues presented in the second trial may
differ substantially from those originating from the initial appeal. In
short, that the state court reaffirms its previous judgment and rules
against the party successful in the Supreme Court does not mean that
the state court is evading the command of the Supreme Court. In many
cases the mandate itself may be ambiguous or merely suggestive, thus
5. During this period, the United States Supreme Court did not hear any cases
from the state supreme courts of Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma and Vermont.
6. This figure represents a midpoint between the percentages of subsequent
litigation found in two previous studies. During the 1941-1951 decade, about one-fourth
of the cases (46 of 175) had further litigation at the state level following a Supreme
Court remand. See Note, Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded
to State Courts Since '94', 67 HARV. L. REv. 1251 (1954). During the 1931-1940 period,
approximately two-thirds of the cases remanded resulted in further litigation. See
Note, Final Disposition of State Court Decisions Reversed and Remanded by the
Supreme Court, October Term, 1931, to October Term, 1941, 55 HARv. L. REv. 1357
(1942).
7. In the 1931-1941 study, this phenomenon occurred in 25 of the 34 cases in
which new issues were raised after the Supreme Court remand. See Note, Final
Disposition of State Court Decisions Reversed and Remanded by the Supreme Court,
October Term, 1931 to October Term, 1941, 55 HARv. L. REv. 1357 (1942). In the
1941-1951 study, nearly one-half of the 46 cases having further litigation found the party
successful in the Supreme Court losing at the state level on remand. See Note, Evasion
of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded to State Courts Since 1941, 67 HARV.
L. REv. 1251 (1954).
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giving the state court some latitude in its later decision.
In this study the term "evasion" is used to describe the shadowy
area between halfhearted compliance and outright defiance. Although
some state court action may be questionable and perhaps "quasi-evasive,"
the narrow construction of "evasion" given in this study requires the
Supreme Court to twice: 1) accept an appeal, 2) issue a mandate and 3)
overrule the judgment of the state supreme court. In other words, a
truly "evasive" state court action does not occur unless the state court
which resists the initial Supreme Court mandate is overruled for a
second time by the Court. Even in these cases, evasion is conditioned
upon the clarity of the original mandate of the Supreme Court.
In order to review other instances of doubtful or "quasi-evasive"
state court action, a second category was devised. Cases comprising this
group include those which appeared to this writer and at least one
dissenting state justice to violate the judicial intent of the Supreme Court
mandate.8 This requirement, together with the traditionally low dissent
rate in state courts of last resort,' limited the subjective elements in
selecting the cases indicative of "quasi-evasive" state court action.
Although the Supreme Court never overruled the adverse state court
judgments in these cases following its initial remand, a brief examination
of these cases clearly suggested a situation far from full compliance. The
"quasi-evasion" cases also demonstrated the wide latitude permitted by
the Supreme Court in decisions remanded to the state courts.
Of the 54 cases in which the state courts, on remand, ruled against
the party successful in the Supreme Court, eight cases met the standards
here established for state court "evasion," and ten cases exemplified
"quasi-evasive" state court action. Only five of these 18 cases were
appealed from state supreme courts in the northern states.'" In fact, only
one-third (18) of the 54 "maverick" cases came from northern courts."
8. For the analysis of cases involving quasi-evasive state court action see notes
54-86 infra and accompanying text.
9. A survey in the early Sixties indicated that the average dissent rate on state
courts of last resort was only 10.6 percent. See Sickels, The Illusion of Judicial Con-
sensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals, 59 Am. POL. Sci. REv.
100 (1965).
10. The five cases from northern state courts came from: Ohio (2); Iowa,
Alaska and Washington (1). The cases from non-northern courts came from:
California (3); Louisiana and Maryland (2); Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina,
Virginia, Florida and Arizona (1).
11. A breakdown of the origin of the 54 cases is as follows: California (12)
Indiana (5); New York, Georgia and Alabama (3); Arizona, Florida, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina and Virginia
(2); Colorado, Alaska, Connecticut, Iowa, Oklahoma, Texas, Washington and West
Virginia (1).
During the period covered by this study, the majority of cases heard by the
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The judicial conflict between the "activist" Warren Court and the more
"conservative" or "states' rights" courts in the South is no better illus-
trated than in these figures. Indeed, the evasiveness of southern supreme
courts may well reflect the greater hostility of the South towards the
United States Supreme Court."
INSTANCES OF EVASIVE STATE COURT ACTION
The first evasion case analyzed in this study, Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc.,"5 involved an appeal requesting injunctive relief
and monetary damages for the refusal of a nonprofit corporation, or-
ganized to operate a community park and playground facility, to permit
a member to lease his home and transfer his membership rights to a
black family. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused to hear
the appeal on the ground that the plaintiff's attorney violated a rule of
civil procedure by not giving the opposing counsel reasonable written
notice of the time and place of tendering the transcript and a reasonable
opportunity to examine it. Subsequently, the United States Supreme
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the state court
for a decision in light of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.'"
On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected further
consideration of the case on the ground that it was without jurisdiction.
Since the petitioner's appeal was not perfected in a manner prescribed
by law, the Virginia court refused to accept the appeal. The state court
also admonished the United States Supreme Court for attempting to
dictate the state's procedural rules.' 5
Supreme Court were from southern states. Of the ten states having the largest
number of cases before the Court, only two were northern states. These ten states
were: California (64), Florida (60), New York (41), Virginia (32), Texas (32),
Ohio (29), Alabama (28), Georgia (20), North Carolina (16) and Louisiana (16).
12. A 1968 Gallup Poll disclosed that 66 percent of the South had an unfavorable
attitude toward the Supreme Court with only 23 percent holding a favorable opinion.
At the same time, national statistics indicated that 45 percent of the people held a
positive reaction to the Supreme Court while 46 percent had a negative feeling
toward the Court. See N.Y. Times, July 10, 1968, at 19, col. 2.
13. 392 U.S. 657 (vacated mem.), on remand, 209 Va. 279, 163 S.E.2d 588
(1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
14. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). In Jones, the Court held that it was illegal under
the 1866 Civil Rights Act and unconstitutional under the involuntary servitude clause
of the thirteenth amendment for one to discriminate on the basis of race in purchas-
ing, leasing or selling public or private property. The 1866 Civil Rights Act provides:
All citizens of the United States have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
15. The opinion of the Virginia court asserted: "Only this court may say when
it does not have jurisdiction under its Rules. We had no jurisdiction in the cases
264
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The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and, in a 5-3 opinion,
rejected the rationale of the Virginia court and reversed the judg-
ment."8 The Court ruled that the public accommodations provision of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not supercede the provisions of the 1866
Civil Rights Act which prohibited private racial discrimination in leasing,
selling and inheriting property. Moreover, the right to lease was pro-
tected from discriminatory actions of third parties as well as from the
immediate lessor. Although there were no provisions in the 1866 Act
for awarding damages, the majority cited several authorities permitting
the Court to allow monetary recovery for a denial of a federal right.'
The Supreme Court also accused the Virginia court of denying a federal
right by rigidly applying state rules of procedure. While the procedural
rule was not novel, the Court contended that it was applied more stringent-
ly to the petitioners in the instant case than in many past cases."8 To
the Supreme Court, the action of the Virginia court was clearly evasive.
Another example of state court evasion was the jury selection case
of Coleman v. Alabama"9 which was twice appealed to the Supreme
Court and twice reversed and remanded to the state supreme court.
The petitioner, a black man sentenced to death following his conviction
for murdering a white mechanic, based his appeal on the ground that
jury selection in Greene County, Alabama, systematically and arbitrarily
discriminated against black people in violation of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Although the
defendant's attorney failed to raise the issue of systematic exclusion
prior to the trial, on appeal the Supreme Court of Alabama exercised
its discretionary powers, considered the issue and held that the petitioner
when they were here before, and we have no jurisdiction now." Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 209 Va. 279, 281, 163 S.E.2d 588, 589 (1968).
16. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). With the loss
of Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas, and the appointment of Chief Justice
Burger, the 7-2 decision on the first appeal was narrowed to 5-3 on the second
appeal. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan and White, in dissenting, leveled
strong criticism against the majority opinion and its assertion of federal supervisory
powers over state procedural rules. Id. at 241 (dissenting opinion).
17. The majority claimed that "existence of a statutory right implies the
existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies." Id. at 239. The Court in a pre-
vious decision had held that "[tihe power to enforce implies the power to make
effective the right of recovery afforded by the Act." Deckert v. Independence Shares
Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940).
18. See Bolin v. Laderberg, 207 Va. 795, 153 S.E.2d 251 (1967); Cook v.
Virginia Holsum Bakeries, 207 Va. 815, 153 S.E.2d 209 (1967); Stokley v. Owens,
189 Va. 248, 52 S.E.2d 164 (1949).
19. 276 Ala. 513, 164 So. 2d 704 (1963), rev'd, 377 U.S. 129, on remand state
supreme court remanded for hearings on inotion for new trial, 276 Ala. 513, 518,
164 So. 2d 704, 708 (1964) and aff'd forner conviction after hearing, 280 Ala. 509,
195 So. 2d 800, rev'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 22 (1967).
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had not met the burden of proving racial discrimination.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, after citing a number
of precedents prohibiting systematic exclusion from jury service, re-
versed the judgment and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of
Alabama with instructions that the defendant be given the opportunity
to offer evidence to support his claim.
The state court, after admonishing the Supreme Court for ac-
commodating a "technicality" and describing the Court's rationale as
"sophistical," remanded the case to the Circuit Court of Greene County
for a hearing on the issue of whether blacks were systematically excluded
from the jury rolls. Although the evidence presented at the hearing
showed that blacks comprised 82 percent of the general population and
67 percent of the adult males over 21, the trial court ruled that syste-
matic jury discrimination was not proven by the fact that less than 10
percent of the "qualified" jurors in Greene County were black."0
In the second appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
conviction on the ground that, absent contrary state evidence, the peti-
tioner had proven systematic jury discrimination. The Court was very
critical of the justification advanced by the state for the disparity between
the percentage of blacks living in Greene County and the number of
blacks currently and historically appearing on its jury rolls. Although
the state contended that there were a number of factors explaining the
disparity in the number of "eligible" jurors, the only argument advanced
to justify the gross disparity was that some Negroes had disqualified
themselves by committing crimes or leaving the county. State court action
in this case appeared highly evasive. Throughout the litigation of this
case, the Alabama Supreme Court seemed deliberately to evade relevant
Supreme Court precedents and the implicit mandate of the first remand.
An Arizona loyalty oath case also presents a problem of compliance.
In Elfbrandt v. Russell,2 the Supreme Court vacated and remanded a
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court upholding the state's loyalty oath
requirement for public officers and employees. The Court remanded the
case for further consideration in light of the decision in Baggett v.
Bullitt.
22
20. See Coleman v. Alabama, 280 Ala. 509, 511, 195 So. 2d 800, 801 (1967).
Evidence also indicated that no black person had ever served on the grand jury
panels in Greene County and few, if any, served on the petit jury panels. More im-
portantly, no blacks had served on the grand or petit juries which indicted and con-
victed Coleman. See Coleman v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 22, 23 (1967).
21. 94 Ariz. 1, 381 P.2d 554 (1963), vacated mem., 378 U.S. 127, on remand, 97
Ariz. 140, 397 P.2d 944 (1964), rev'd, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
22. 377 U.S. 360 (1964). In Baggett, the Supreme Court overruled two Wash-
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Thereafter, the Arizona Supreme Court, with one member dissent-
ing, reinstated its previous decision upholding the mandatory state
loyalty oath which subjected public employees to perjury prosecution
and dismissal if, having taken the oath, they knowingly and wilfully
became or remained members of the American Communist Party or any
other organization advocating the violent overthrow of the government.
As scienter was clearly required, the majority saw no conflict with con-
stitutional rights.
Dissenting from the Arizona court's opinion, Justice Bernstein
asserted that the membership clause of the oath was unconstitutionally
vague and ambiguous since it made it a crime to be a member of any
organization having as one of its subordinate purposes the overthrow
of the government. According to Justice Bernstein, a scientist could never
know whether his association with international organizations and acade-
micians in other countries would result in prosecution from the govern-
ment or praise from the university.
Accepting the case for the second time, the Supreme Court reversed
the state supreme court and declared the Arizona loyalty oath uncon-
stitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas declared that
any law which automatically punished membership without the "specific
intent" to further the illegal goals of the organization ran the hazard
of punishing "guiltless behavior." The majority declared that only when
a member actively participates in illegal activities can he be removed for
disloyalty. To do otherwise would constitute guilt by association.
Dissenting, Justices White, Clark, Harlan and Stewart argued that
a state had the right to limit state employment to persons not associated
with subversive organizations. Although they appeared willing to prohibit
criminal penalties for loyalty oath violations, the dissenters were adamant
about the right of a state to disqualify persons who belonged to subversive
organizations from public employment. At most, they asserted that a
remand rather than a reversal should have been issued.
Interestingly, Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion in
Baggett and the dissenting opinion in Elfbrandt, never mentioned or
ington loyalty oaths for public employees on grounds of vagueness. The first oath pro-
hibited "subversives" from holding public employment. A "subversive" person or
organization included one that engaged in or assisted activities intended to "over-
throw, destroy or alter" the state or federal governments. The second oath required
teachers to swear that they would "promote respect for the flag and the institutions"
of the state and federal governments and encourage "reverence for law and order and
undivided allegiance to the government of the United States." Id. at 362.
Similarly, the Arizona loyalty statute prohibited public employees from aiding
"in the commission of any act to overthrow by force or violence the government"
or belonging to any organization, "knowingly and wilfully," which has this purpose
as one of its objectives. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-231 (1971).
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distinguished the instant case from the former. Although some of Justice
White's concerns in Baggett were incorporated in Justice Bernstein's
dissent from the Arizona court's opinion and again in Justice Douglas'
majority opinion in Elfbrandt, the Supreme Court dissenters contended
that a statute requiring "knowing" membership was not unconstitu-
tionally vague.
In short, because of the sharp 5-4 division on the Supreme Court,
the state court action in Elfbrandt was probably the least "evasive" in
this study. It could be argued that the Arizona Supreme Court had no
way of accurately predicting the decision of the United States Supreme
Court. On the other hand, the 7-2 remand must have offered some
direction.
Chamberlin v. Board of Public Instruction" represented a classic
example of evasive state court action. The plaintiffs in this case sought
injunctions against various religious exercises and requirements-Bible
reading, recitation of the Lord's Prayer and other sectarian prayers,
sectarian baccalaureate programs, a religious census among children and
a religious qualification for teaching-in Dade County public schools.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court
denying relief. The United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous per
curiam opinion, vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further
consideration in light of School District v. Schempp.24
On remand, the Florida Supreme Court vainly attempted to dis-
tinguish the fact situations in Chamberlin from the circumstances of
Schempp. Reinstating their previous decision, the state court justices
upheld the constitutionality of the state law on the ground that the
primary purpose of Bible reading and prayers was secular-building
good citizenship and inculcating morality-not sectarian.25 In so ruling,
the justices refused to take cognizance of another Supreme Court pre-
cedent which held that a religious means cannot be used to obtain a
secular end. Moreover, the unanimous Florida Supreme Court decision
contended that whereas the intent of the Pennsylvania and Maryland
Legislatures as seen by the Court in Schempp was ambiguous, the intent
23. 143 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1962), vacated mem., 374 U.S. 487 (1963), on remand,
160 So. 2d 97 (Fla.), rev'd per curiam, 377 U.S. 402 (1964).
24. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The Schempp case concerned a Pennsylvania Bible
reading statute, while the case of Murray v. Curlett, which was consolidated in the
same opinion, concerned both Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer in
Baltimore, Maryland, schools.
25. Chamberlin v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 160 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1964).
The Florida Supreme Court based its opinion on the "legislative purpose and primary
effect" doctrine announced in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1962).
26. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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of the Florida Legislature in the instant case was clear and unequivocal.
A closer examination of this claim, however, indicates that this assertion
was only half correct. Although the intent of the Maryland Legislature
was not disclosed, the appellant's brief in Schempp revealed the secular
intent of the Pennsylvania Legislature. In addition, the explanatory
language used to justify Bible reading by the Pennsylvania and Florida
lawmakers was almost identical."
The Florida justices also made the rather flimsy excuse that the
separate concurrences in Schempp left no "clear course for the state
courts to follow."2 Yet, an analysis of the three concurrences in Schempp
clearly demonstrates that all eight Justices in the majority strongly
subscribed to the belief that government prescribed Bible reading and
prayers should not be permitted in public schools. Even Justice Stewart
in dissent asked only that the cases be remanded to the state courts to
determine if coercion was involved.29 In finding the fact situations
inapposite and rejecting any authority or responsibility to "speculate"
on the Supreme Court's philosophy, the state justices appeared to invite
federal intervention by denying civil liberties. Speculating on why the
Florida Supreme Court refused to follow the clear mandate of the United
States Supreme Court, one commentator suggested that the court was
trying to avoid a publicly unpopular decision and resist federal inter-
vention."
Following the state court's decision upholding religious practices
in public schools, the case was again appealed to the United States
Supreme Court where a unanimous Court ruled that devotional Bible
readings and prayers were unconstitutional. Although Justices Douglas
and Black believed that the issue concerning religious tests for public
27. For further analysis of this decision see Harris, Constitutional Law: Religi-
ous Practice in Public Schools, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 484 (1964).
28. 160 So. 2d at 99.
29. Justice Stewart admitted:
It is conceivable that . . . school boards . . might eventually find it
impossible to administer a system of religious exercises during school hours
in such a way as to meet this constitutional standard-in such a way as
completely to free from any kind of official coercion those who do not
affirmatively want to participate.
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 320 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
30. Harris, Constitutional Law: Religious Practices in Public Schools, 17
U. FLA. L. REv. 484 (1964). The Florida Supreme Court was reprimanded in these
words:
Apparently the Supreme Court of Florida is saying that if the plaintiffs
wish to have their civil rights determined they must go to the federal courts.
This is strange language from those who most loudly profess a desire to
minimize federal intervention.
Id. at 486.
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school teachers was also ripe for adjudication, all of the Justices agreed
that baccalaureate services and a religious census in public schools did
not present substantial federal questions. Subsequent to this decision,
the Florida Supreme Court, considering the case for the third time,
complied with the decision of the Supreme Court and prohibited govern-
ment sanctioned Bible reading and prayers in public schools."'
Evidence of noncompliance was also discovered in two self-
incrimination cases remanded by the Supreme Court in light of Griffin
v. California2 and Chapman v. California." In Fontaine v. California,"
the defendant appealed his conviction for the sale of marihuana on the
grounds that his fifth amendment rights were violated by the comments
of the prosecutor and the trial judge concerning his failure to take the
stand and testify on his own behalf."5 Following the Supreme Court re-
mand, the state supreme court reinstated its original judgment affirming
the conviction. Although the facts in this case were closely parallel to the
Chapman case cited in the remand mandate, the California Supreme
Court unanimously ruled that the constitutional error in the instant case
was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" and was therefore not con-
trolled by the Chapman dictum.
The Supreme Court, two Justices dissenting, disagreed with the
state court and reversed the judgment. Since the state's informer, who
allegedly bought marihuana from the defendant, had disappeared and
was unable to testify in court, the Supreme Court majority held that
Fontaine was being convicted "on the basis of circumstantial evidence."3
31. Chamberlin v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 171 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1965).
32. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). In Griffin, a 5-3 majority held that comments by the
judge and prosecutor on defendant's failure to testify were not permissible even
when the court had instructed the jury not to draw any inferences of guilt from the
exercise of this right.
33. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Chapman dictum indicated that before a trial
error can be held "harmless," the reviewing court must be able to declare that the
error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." In this case both the trial judge
and the prosecuting attorney had commented on the failure of the defendants to
testify in their own defense. Justice Black, writing for the majority, concluded that
although there was "strong 'circumstantial . . . evidence' against the petitioners
. . . absent the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest, fairminded jurors
might very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts." Id. at 25-26 (citation omitted).
34. 237 Cal. App. 2d 320, 46 Cal. Rptr. 855 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), vacated
mem., 386 U.S. 263, on remand, 252 Cal. App. 2d 73, 60 Cal. Rptr. 325 (Ct.
App. 1967), rev'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 593 (1968).
35. The trial judge's instructions to the jury suggested that adverse inferences
could be drawn from the defendant's silence. His instructions read, in relevant part:
[I]f he does not testify or if, though he does testify, he fails to deny or
explain such evidence, the jury may take that failure into consideration
as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence . . ..
Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593, 595 (1968).
36. Id. at 596.
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In light of this, the United States Supreme Court could not agree that
the state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous com-
ments of the prosecutor and the inappropriate instructions of the trial
judge had no relation to the defendant's conviction.
A similar situation occurred in O'Connor v. Ohio,"7 with the added
issue of the adequacy of state criminal procedures. As in Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 8 the state supreme court originally refused
to hear the appeal on the ground that the appeal did not conform to
state procedural rules. The United States Supreme Court, however,
vacated the judgment and remanded the cause to the state court for
a decision in light of Griffin v. California."8 On remand, a sharply
divided Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed its initial judgment. Speaking
for the majority, Chief justice Taft contended that the state supreme
court could properly refuse to consider a claim of error that was not
raised in or considered by the trial or lower appellate courts. He claimed
that the state supreme court did not have the power or authority to
decide whether constitutional rights have been violated unless the federal
rights had been "seasonably raised" in accordance with the require-
ments of state law. Moreover, the majority asserted that the Griffin
dictum was inapplicable in the instant case because it occurred after
O'Connor had been adjudicated by the state courts.
Dissenting from the state court opinion, Justices O'Neill, Herbert
and Brown contended that the Griffin rule, although not retrospective
in. its application, was meant to apply to all cases pending on direct
appeal at the time Griffin was announced. They argued that O'Connor
fell "squarely within" the guidelines established by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the state court dis-
senters that the defendant's failure to object to prejudicial comments
and instructions by the prosecution and trial judge at the time of his
trial did not preclude his right on direct appeal to attack that practice,
following its invalidation by the Supreme Court in Griffin. Since the
defendant could not have anticipated the Griffin decision any more than
the state could have, the Supreme Court ruled that Ohio's procedural
37. 382 U.S. 286 (1965) (vacated per curiam), on remand, 6 Ohio St. 2d 169,
217 N.E.2d 685, rezvd per curiam, 385 U.S. 92 (1966).
38. 392 U.S. 657 (vacated mem.), on remand, 209 Va. 279, 163 S.E.2d 588(1968), rev'd, 396 U.S. 229 (1969). See notes 13-18 supra and accompanying text.
39. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See note 32 supra.
40. State v. O'Connor, 6 Ohio St. 2d 169, 176, 217 N.E.2d 685, 689 (1969)
(dissenting opinion). As noted by the state court dissenters, a precedent had already
been established which stated that Griffin applied to all convictions which had not
become final on the date of the Griffin decision. See Tehan v. United States ex rel.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
1972]
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 [1972], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol6/iss3/2
272 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
rule could not negate the defendant's "meritorious federal claim.""
In short, there is little doubt that the mandate in both Fontaine
and O'Connor was consciously evaded by the action of the California
and Ohio Supreme Courts on remand. Ultimately, however, the
Supreme Court prevailed by directly reversing both state court decisions.
Another good example of state court evasion was found in the
first degree murder case of McLeod v. Ohio.2 On the ground that no
debatable constitutional issue was presented, the Ohio Supreme Court
had unanimously dismissed the defendant's appeal and upheld the judg-
ment of the trial court which stated that the oral confession given by the
defendant, prior to his arraignment and without the assistance of counsel,
was admissible in court. The United States Supreme Court accepted the
case, vacated the judgment and remanded the cause in light of Massiah
v. United States.3
Following the Supreme Court remand, the state court reinstated
its previous decision affirming the constitutionality of the oral con-
fession made by the defendant. The dissenters from the Ohio Supreme
Court decision were highly critical of the majority opinion. They con-
tended that the defendant, indicted on October 3, 1960, and not arraigned
until the 14th (three days after his oral confession), was denied due
process. Since counsel was not provided until the defendant had con-
fessed and was brought into court, the dissenters argued that counsel
for the accused did not have reasonable or sufficient time to examine the
indictment and prepare an adequate defense. Citing the precedent
suggested by the Supreme Court, the dissenters argued that the clear
dictum of Massiah suggested that if the state court majority desired to
obey the mandate of the Supreme Court and avoid the "embarassment"
of being overruled again on appeal, it must reverse its prior judgment."
41. O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92 (1966).
42. 173 Ohio St. 520, 184 N.E2d 101 (1962), vacated mem., 378 U.S. 582, on
remand, 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349 (1964), rev'd inem., 381 U.S. 356 (1965).
43. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). In Massiah, the Supreme Court overruled a conviction
based on a statement elicited by an accomplice cooperating with the police by means
of a radio hidden in the auto of the informer. Without reaching the search and seizure
issue, the Court held that incriminating statements made by the defendant to the co-
defendant, following their indictment and release on bail, and in the absence of an
attorney, were not admissible in court due to the fifth, sixth and fourteenth
amendments.
44. Citing a recent Ohio Supreme Court decision which had been remanded
by the United States Supreme Court in "strikingly similar" language and subsequently
reversed by the Supreme Court following the state court's reinstatement of its
prior judgment, the two Ohio dissenters declared that "[slurely no judge of this
court can relish being told again, as we were in Doughty v. Maxwell (1964), 376 U.S.
202 . . . , upon reappeal that we must reverse our judgment." Ohio v. McLeod, 1
Ohio St. 2d 60, 64, 203 N.E.2d 349, 352 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
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In a second appeal to the Supreme Court, the position of the dissenters
was adopted by a 6-3 vote of the United States Supreme Court and the
case was remanded to the state supreme court."
The final example of evasive state court action was Sims v.
Georgia," which involved a conviction for forcible rape. The Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the defendant, holding that,
despite recent Supreme Court decisions, it was not improper to leave
the question of voluntariness of a confession to the jurors. Curiously,
Chief Justice Duckworth took the opportunity to level some "respectful"
criticism at the United States Supreme Court for meddling with the
criminal procedures enacted by states. He accused the Warren Court of
permitting personal ideology to influence judicial decision-making and
contended that the wisdom and integrity of judges were no more reliable
than those of jurors.4? Echoing the sentiments of many state judges,
Chief Justice Duckworth asserted that the Supreme Court must respect
state laws and remove its "heavy hand" from "the throats of State
courts."48 As an expression of federalism and states' rights, Justice
Duckworth commented:
We yield to no living men in our appreciation of and highest
respect for the Supreme Court as a vital part of our Govern-
ment and its proper supremacy over all courts, including this
one. But if those occupying it will not uphold State procedure
law that is constitutional and follow their own decisions sus-
taining those laws, chaos will reign in the lower courts of
America. We hope the present Justices will, after more mature
consideration overrule Jackson v. Denno . . . and allow State
courts to try cases according to law rather than the personal
notions of just barely half of the Justices."'
45. McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965).
46. 221 Ga. 190, 144 S.E.2d 103 (1965), rev'd, 385 U.S. 538, on remand state
supreme court remanded for hearing on voluntariness of confession, 223 Ga. 126, 153
S.E.2d 567 and aff'd former conviction after hearing, 223 Ga. 465, 156 S.E.2d 65,
rev'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 404 (1967). Sims, an indigent and illiterate black man, was
convicted of raping a white woman and was sentenced to death. The first rape con-
viction was reversed by the state supreme court on the ground that the defendant was
not adequately represented by counsel. See Sims v. Balkcon, 220 Ga. 7, 136 S.E.2d
766 (1964). The court noted that since 1930, 58 blacks and 3 whites had been executed
for rape in Georgia. Id.
47. As stated by the Georgia Chief Justice:
Justices should remember that they have no monopoly on either wisdom
or integrity, and before they indict the reliability of jurors, they should
think of the sacred challenge that the guiltless cast the first stone.
Sims v. State, 221 Ga- 190, 203, 144 S.E2d 103, 113 (1965).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Although the Georgia Supreme Court majority did not believe they
were violating Jackson v. Denno5 ° in affirming the Sims case, Justice
Almand contended that Georgia's procedural methods regarding the
voluntariness and involuntariness of confessions were the same as those
of New York which were declared unconstitutional in Jackson.5
In the first appeal to the Supreme Court, the case was reversed
and remanded to the Georgia Supreme Court with directions that the
state judiciary allow the defendant a hearing on the voluntariness of his
confession. Justice Clark, writing for the Court, disagreed with the
contention of the Georgia Supreme Court that the Sims case offered no
clear-cut issue of a physically coerced confession. Justice Clark
pointed out that the defendant's claim of mistreatment was never con-
tradicted by the police.
On remand, the state supreme court, after directing a hearing on the
voluntariness of the confession by the lower court, unanimously affirmed
the former conviction after concluding that the confession had been
voluntary. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Georgia
court for the second time, ruling that the defendant's confession must be
considered involuntary in the absence of contradictory state evidence.52
The Court also found that the process of selecting the defendant's jury
was racially discriminatory 'and unconstitutional.5" Sims was a classic
example of state court resistance to a Supreme Court mandate.
In summary, state court action in the eight cases reviewed above
demonstrated an obvious conflict in judicial decision-making. In each
case the United States Supreme Court expressed an implicit mandate
for the state court to follow only to have it rejected subsequently by the
state court. Although the state courts attempted either to distinguish
their instant cases from the precedents cited or to narrowly interpret the
Court's mandate, evidence clearly suggests that the state courts con-
50. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
51. Sims v. State, 221 Ga. 190, 205, 144 S.E.2d 103, 114 (1965) (dissenting
opinion).
52. Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967). Since the reconstruction of this case
by the state court was based entirely on the printed record of the original trial, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided the case for the second time without
waiting for new briefs by the state.
53. Id. Findings indicated that the grand and petit jury lists were drawn from
the county tax digests which separately listed taxpayers by race in conformity with
Georgia law. Blacks comprised 24.4 percent of the taxpayers in the county, but
only 4.7 percent of the names on the grand jury list and 9.8 percent of the names
on the traverse jury list from which the defendants' grand and petit jurors were
selected. There was one black on the grand jury indicting the defendant and five
on the jury list from which the all-white trial jury was selected. See Sims v. Georgia,
389 U.S. 404, 407 (1967).
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sciously violated the intent of forthright remands. Nor was the United
States Supreme Court sharply divided in most of these mandates. Of the
eight cases, five were decided on second appeal by a unanimous Supreme
Court; only one case had more than three dissenters.
INSTANCES OF QUAsI-EVASIVE STATE COURT ACTION
In addition to the eight examples of "evasive" state court action
during the last decade of the Warren Court, there were ten other in-
stances of doubtful state court action which can be classified as "quasi-
evasive." As noted above, to minimize subjective classification, cases
were not considered "quasi-evasive" unless at least one state court
justice and this writer discovered meaningful discrepancies between the
Supreme Court mandate and the subsequent state court decision." While,
unlike the evasion decisions, the Supreme Court never considered these
cases again following the initial remands, these adverse state court
decisions at least suggest less than full compliance with the Supreme
Court's implicit directions.
The first example of quasi-evasive state court action analyzed in
this study involved civil rights demonstrations in Maryland. In Bell v.
Maryland,55 the United States Supreme Court vacated the criminal
trespass conviction of 12 black students who had staged a sit-in demon-
stration at a cafe." The case was remanded to the state court to consider
54. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. For the sake of brevity, the textual
analysis of quasi-evasion cases in this study will be confined to four first amendment
cases and one sixth amendment case concerning cross-examination. The five quasi-
evasion cases not analyzed in this article are: Hudgins v. California, 236 Cal. App.
2d 578, 46 Cal. Rptr. 199 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), vacated mem., 386 U.S. 265, on
remand, 252 Cal. App. 2d 174, 60 Cal. Rptr. 176 (Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 965 (1968) (self-incrimination) ; Garner v. California, 234 Cal. App. 2d 212, 44
Cal. Rptr. 217 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965), vacated mem., 386 U.S. 272 (1967), on remand,
258 Cal. App. 2d 420, 65 Cal. Rptr. 780 (Ct. App. 1968) (self-incrimination); Local
721, United Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 254 Iowa 882, 119
N.W.2d 141 (1963), rev'd, 376 U.S. 247 (1964), on remand, 260 Iowa 908, 151 N.W.2d
540, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967) (labor-management relations) ; Mcllvaine v.
Louisiana, 245 La. 649, 160 So. 2d 566 (1964), vacated mem., 379 U.S. 10, on remand,
247 La. 747, 174 So. 2d 515 (1965) (search and seizure) ; McDaniel v. North Carolina,
272 N.C. 556, 158 S.E.2d 874, vacated mem., 392 U.S. 665, on remand, 274 N.C. 574,
164 S.E.2d 469 (1968) (self-incrimination).
55. 227 Md. 302, 176 A.2d 771 (1962), rev'd, 378 U.S. 226, on remand, 236 Md.
356, 204 A.2d 54 (1964).
56. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). Concurring, Justices Douglas and
Goldberg contended that the Supreme Court should have decided constitutional issues
instead of remanding the case to the state courts. Id. at 242 (concurring opinion).
Conversely, dissenting Justices Black, Harlan and White asserted that the Court should
have limited itself to the issue whether state enforcement of trespass laws violates
equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 318 (dissenting
opinion).
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the effect of a supervening change in state law which occurred subsequent
to the trial and conviction of the defendants but prior to the grant of
certiorari by the Supreme Court.5" According to Justice Brennan, the
majority opinion writer, the Supreme Court had refused to consider
the constitutional issues in this case because most of the Justices believed
that the state court would reverse the convictions in light of the new law
which abolished the crime for which the appellants were convicted.
On remand, the Maryland high court upheld the convictions on the
ground that neither the Maryland public accommodations law nor the
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was intended to apply retroactively. Most
important, the court ruled that the state's "general savings clause" was
controlling.58 In dissent, Judge Oppenheimer argued that the general
savings clause was inapplicable when one considered legislative intent
and the new meaning of "wanton trespass" following the passage of the
public accommodations act. Judge Oppenheimer further noted that the
savings clause statute had never before been interpreted as continuing
a former law in effect "for the purpose of punishing an offense com-
mitted prior to the subsequent legislation where the later act did not
either in terms eliminate the criminality of the defendant's action or
change the penalties."59 Evading a libertarian interpretation of the new
state public accommodations laws, the Maryland majority effectively
avoided the sentiment expressed in Justice Brennan's majority opinion.
A second Maryland case involving quasi-evasive state court action
concerned a disorderly conduct arrest of three whites and one black in
57. The public accommodations law went into effect on June 1, 1963-a year and
a half after the state court affirmed the trespass convictions and nine days prior to
the grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court It provided that no owner, operator
or employee of places of public accommodation (restaurant, hotel) may refuse to serve
another person because of the race, creed, color or national origin of the person
seeking to be served. The state law applied to the city of Baltimore, where the
defendants were arrested, and to 12 of Maryland's 23 counties. MD. ANN. CODE art.
49B, § 11 (Supp. 1963). On March 14, 1964, the Maryland Legislature extended the
coverage of the public accommodations law to all areas of the state. Moreover, on
June 8, 1962--only six months after the state's high court had affirmed the petitioners'
conviction-Baltimore passed an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in public ac-
commodations. BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 14A, § 10A (1962).
58. MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 3 (1957), provided that any repeal or amendment
of a statute should not release, extinguish or change the criminal penalties incurred
under such statutes unless expressly indicated in the repealing statute.
59. Bell v. State, 236 Md. 356, 373-74, 204 A.2d 54, 64 (1964) (dissenting
opinion). Judge Oppenheimer continued:
[Wihen the Legislature created new rights in the public accommodations
law, it did not intend the savings clause statute, which is only applicable
in cases of amendment or repeal, to apply.
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a segregated, privately-owned amusement park. In Drews v. Maryland,0
a unanimous Supreme Court vacated the petitioner's convictions and
asked the Maryland Court of Appeals to consider its judgment in light of
Griffin v. Maryland1 and Bell v. Maryland." On remand, the Maryland
court affirmed its previous judgment by distinguishing the facts and issues
in Drews from those represented in Griffin and Bell. The majority
opinion contended that since the police made no effort to eject the tres-
passing demonstrators from the park until the manager requested their
dssistance, the state was not a "cooperative" party in the private segrega-
tion policy. 8
Dissenting, Judge Oppenheimer saw no substantial difference
between the facts presented in Griffin and those found in Drews. He
contended that since the demonstrators used no force, the convictions
for "disorderly conduct" were highly suspect. Judge Oppenheimer con-
cluded that the case should be remanded to a lower court to determine
if the security officer hired by the park was appointed by the Baltimore
police; he felt the conviction definitely should be reversed if evidence
indicated that the park official was a special police officer. 4
The United States Supreme Court dismissed a second appeal for
lack of jurisdiction. However, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas
dissented, believing that the defendants' actions were protected by the
1964 Civil Rights Act and not punishable under the state's disorderly
conduct law; they felt that certiorari should be granted.
Quasi-evasion was also found in a Washington loyalty oath case.
In Nostrand v. Little,6 5 the state supreme court upheld the constitu-
tionality of Washington's loyalty oath requirement for public employ-
60. 224 Md. 186, 167 A.2d 341 (1961), vacated mem., 378 U.S. 547, on remand,
236 Md. 349, 204 A.2d 64 (1964), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 381 U.S. 421
(1965).
61. 378 U.S. 130 (1964). In Griffin, the Supreme Court held that the arrest of
civil rights demonstrators by a private amusement park officer licensed by the govern-
ment to make arrests, as a salaried member of a detective agency or as a non-salaried
special deputy sheriff, constituted state action and was therefore prohibited by the
fourteenth amendment.
62. 378 U.S. 226 (1964). See notes 55-59 supra and accompanying text.
63. Drews v. State, 236 Md. 349, 204 A2d 64 (1964). Since the park had
a legal right to maintain a business policy of excluding Negroes, the Maryland judges
contended that the arrests were not made because the state desired or intended to
maintain a segregated park but because the defendants were inciting the crowd
by refusing to obey valid commands to move from a place where they had no lawful
right to be.
64. Id. at 355, 204 A.2d at 67 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
65. [Nostrand v. Balmer], 53 Wash. 2d 460, 335 P.2d 10 (1959), vacated per
curiam sub. non., Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S. 474 (1960), on remand, 58 Wash.
2d 111, 361 P.2d 551 (1961), appeal dismissed per curiam, 368 U.S. 436 (1962).
1972]
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 [1972], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol6/iss3/2
278 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
ment.6" State law required each public employee to indicate, under penalty
of perjury, whether he or she was a member of any organization con-
sidered "subversive" by the United States Attorney General. The
statute imposed a penalty of automatic dismissal for anyone who refused
on any grounds to take the oath." Two professors at the University of
Washington were summarily dismissed for refusing to take the loyalty
oath.
With two dissents, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the state court to determine whether
state law afforded a public employee an opportunity for a hearing to
explain his refusal to take the oath."8 On remand, the Washington
Supreme Court ruled that while the state Subversive Activities Act did
not accord public employees the right to have a hearing, the employment
contracts of university professors provided for a hearing before a tenure
committee. Although the majority interpreted the Supreme Court man-
date as merely requiring the state supreme court to determine whether
the petitioners were entitled to a hearing before they could be dis-
charged, a strong dissent contended that the state supreme court had
violated the mandate of the Supreme Court by narrowly interpreting
its command. In dissenting from the state court opinion, Justice Mallery
argued that the loyalty oath law should be declared unconstitutional
because it did not guarantee a hearing to any or all public employees.
In fact, the law itself provided no protection for teachers, much less
firemen, policemen and other public employees. As Justice Mallery wrote:
"Implicit in the remand is the implication that, if we hold that such a
hearing is not afforded by the Act, it is 'violative of due process.' "6
Indeed, an analysis of the Supreme Court mandate strongly suggests
that the Supreme Court intended the state court to determine whether
the loyalty statute itself provided for a hearing. 0
66. The Washington Supreme Court construed this law as requiring the element
of scienter. Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wash. 2d 460, 335 P.2d 10 (1959).
67. The Washington loyalty oath statute provides that every public employee must
state under oath whether or not he or she is a member of the communist
party or other subversive organization, and refusal to answer on any grounds
shall be cause for immediate termination of such employee's employment.
WAsH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 9.81.080 (1961) (emphasis added).
68. Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S. 474 (1960) (per curiam). justices Douglas
and Black in dissenting considered the remand "useless." They contended that the
state supreme court had already resolved any ambiguity in the loyalty oath statute
and asked their brethren to consider the constitutional issues raised in the case.
Id. at 476 (dissenting opinion).
69. Nostrand v. Little, 58 Wash. 2d 111, 138, 361 P.2d 551, 567 (1961) (dis-
senting opinion).
70. The Supreme Court had stated:
[W]e cannot say how the Supreme Court of Washington would construe
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On a subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed the case for
lack of a substantial federal question. When the Supreme Court failed to
consider first and fourteenth amendment rights, they left only the ad-
ministrative relief afforded by a hearing-a relief teachers received only
if they refused to take the oath. Dissenting, Justices Douglas and Black
thought that the Court should have determined the basic constitutional
issue that was tendered-whether a teacher had the right to refuse to
take the oath. 1
The Nostrand case is an excellent example of the limited jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts and the deference shown by the United States
Supreme Court to the state courts of last resort. As demonstrated in
this case, the Supreme Court will generally refuse to strike down a state
statute on constitutional grounds until the state courts have had the
opportunity to interpret the meaning of the state law in question.7 2
Desiring to avoid Supreme Court reversal, the state courts often con-
strue the local statutes to conform with minimal constitutional standards.
Given the apparent clarity of the Washington loyalty oath law, the
this statute [loyalty oath law] on the hearing point.
The declaratory nature of the case, the fact that the State's statute
here under attack supplements previous statutory provisions raising questions
concerning the applicability of the latter . . . bring us to the conclusion
that we must remand the case for further consideration.
Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S. 472, 475-76 (1960).
71. Criticizing the majority opinion dismissing a second appeal, Justices Douglas
and Black asserted that the action taken by the Washington Supreme Court in
dismissing the complaint
deprives appellants [teachers] of their right to declaratory relief on ques-
tions we have never decided. They are remitted to the administrative relief
afforded by a hearing .... Whether they can preserve in an administrative
proceeding, the full array of constitutional questions which they now tender is
at least debatable, since the judgment that dismisses their complaint decided
all the constitutional questions, except the right to a hearing, against them.
Nostrand v. Little, 368 U.S. 436, 438 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
72. Another fine example of the Supreme Court's unwillingness to decide con-
stitutional questions before the state courts have had the opportunity of ruling on
the same issues was Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). In Henry, the Supreme
Court remanded the case for determination whether the defendant had waived his
right to object to tainted search and seizure evidence. Justifying its remand, the
majority expressed the following sentiments concerning the proper meshing of the dual
judiciary in America:
By permitting the Mississippi courts to make an initial determination of
waiver, we serve the causes of efficient administration of criminal justice,
and of harmonious federal-state relations . . . . The court is not blind to the
fact that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction has been a source of irritation
between federal and state judiciaries. It has been suggested that this friction
might be ameliorated if the states would look upon our decisions in Fay v.
Noia . . . as affording them an opportunity to provide state procedures . . .
for a full airing of federal claims. That prospect is better served by a remand
than by relegating petitioner to his federal habeas remedy.
Id. at 452 (citation omitted).
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initial remand by the Supreme Court is difficult to explain except in
light of its policy not to decide a case on its merits until all lower court
remedies have been exhausted. There is evidence that the Court was
uncertain whether all the constitutional issues were fully argued before
the state supreme court. In addition, it is questionable whether the
Washington Supreme Court had taken notice of its supervening decision
in Seattle v. Ross7" which suggested a change in judicial philosophy
to a stricter interpretation of guilt presumption absent a hearing."'
Although the Nostrand ruling of the Washington Supreme Court was
never specifically overruled by the Supreme Court, there is little doubt
that the state court decision deviated from the judicial intent of the
Court's mandate.
Another controversial case illustrating state court avoidance or
quasi-evasion was Watts v. Seward School Board."5 In Watts two
school teachers in Seward, Alaska, who solicited public support to
remove the school superintendent were dismissed from their positions on
grounds of "immorality"-tending to bring public disgrace or disrespect
to the individuals concerned or to the teaching profession. The United
States Supreme Court indicated in its initial opinion that public school
teachers cannot be dismissed for compiling, reproducing or distribut-
ing to the school board a partially inaccurate open letter which is
critical of the administration. However, in view of supervening changes
in state law which granted teachers the same right as other citizens to
criticize public school administrators or other public officials, the Court
remanded the case to the state court. 8
On remand, the state supreme court reinstated its previous judg-
ment upholding the right of a school system to "non-retain" a teacher
73. 54 Wash.2d 655, 344 P.2d 216 (1960).
74. While Nostrand was on direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
the Washington Supreme Court overruled a Seattle ordinance which prohibited any
person from being in any place where narcotics were illegally used, kept or disposed
of. The ordinance, in effect, presumed that a person found in a certain place was
automatically guilty of a crime. Id.
75. 395 P.2d 372 (Alas. 1964), vacated per curiam, 381 U.S. 126 (1965), on
remand, 421 P.2d 586 (Alas. 1966), vacated mem., 391 U.S. 592 (1968), on remand,
454 P2d 732 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 921 (1970).
76. Supervening state legislation limited the definition of "immorality" for
purposes of nonretention of public school teachers to criminal acts involving "moral
turpitude." ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.095 (1965) provided:
No rule or regulation of . . . a local school board, or . . . administrator
may restrict or modify the right of a teacher to engage in comment and
criticism outside school hours, relative to school administrators, members
of the governing body of any school . . . to the same extent that any private
individual may exercise the right.
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who damaged his own or his superintendent's professional prestige or
reflected detrimentally on the teaching profession as a whole. A lengthy
and vigorous dissent challenged the majority's original construction of
"immorality" in light of supervening legislation enacted while the case
was before the state supreme court on remand. Paraphrasing recent state
legislation, Justice Rabinowitz contended that a teacher had
the constitutional right, whether erroneous or not, to be critical
of his superintendent; to discuss with his fellow teachers the
possibility of effectuating the superintendent's removal and to
solicit the support of his fellow teachers for his views."'
The case was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court
and again vacated and remanded, this time in light of Pickering v.
Board of Education."8 The Court ruled that although some of the
teacher's statements in an open letter were inaccurate, there was no
evidence that they were knowingly and recklessly made. Following the
second remand, the Alaska Supreme Court attempted to distinguish
Watts from Pickering and once again reaffirmed its original decision."'
Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court, with Justice Douglas
dissenting, denied certiorari. Thus, after 11 years of hearings and litiga-
tion the Watts case closed in favor of the government.
The final quasi-evasion case to be discussed concerns the procedural
right of cross-examination guaranteed by the sixth amendment. In
Hopper v. Louisiana," the United States Supreme Court vacated a
homicide conviction and remanded the cause in light of Bruton v.
United States.s"
77. Watts v. Seward School Bd., 421 P.2d 586, 623 (Alas. 1967) (dissenting
opinion).
78. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering, the Court upheld the right of a public
school teacher to criticize a pending school bond referendum and the mishandling
of past revenue bonds by the school board and the superintendent. Although some
of the teacher's statements in an open letter were inaccurate, there was no evidence
that they were knowingly or recklessly made.
79. Watts v. Seward School Bd., 454 P.2d 732 (Alas. 1969). The majority
argued that, unlike Pickering, the instant case involved false and reckless state-
ments against an immediate superior resulting in much controversy and an attempt
to recall the school board at a special election. Moreover, the false statements in
Watts did not concern matters of public record which could easily be corrected by the
school board. However, a dissenting opinion argued that Watts, like Pickering,
involved public criticism of a superintendent and issues of "public importance." The
dissent also asserted that there was no evidence that the defendant knowingly or
recklessly made false statements, impeded classroom performance or interfered with
administrative operations of the school system. Id. at 739 (dissenting opinion).
80. 251 La. 77, 203 So. 2d 222 (1967), vacated mem., 392 U.S. 658 (1968),
on remand, 253 La. 439, 218 So. 2d 551 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1012 (1970).
81. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton, a closely parallel case, the Supreme Court
1972]
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 [1972], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol6/iss3/2
282 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
On remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court reasserted its initial
opinion affirming the conviction. 2 The majority argued that although
the confessions by the codefendants in joint trials "technically" violated
the constitutional rights of both defendants to confront hostile witnesses
and thus could not be admitted as evidence, there was no prejudice to
either defendant from admission of the confessions. The court concluded
that state courts were not required to reverse a judgment of conviction
unless the trial error constituted a "substantial" violation of a con-
stitutional right.
However, the dissent countered by arguing that the right to con-
front witnesses was essential to a fair trial and any deprivation of this
right constituted a "presumption of prejudice." Citing the Chapman v.
California dictum,s8 Justice Barham contended:
The federal rule . . . does not require a showing of prejudice
if a substantial constitutional right has been abrogated. It is
not the nature or extent of the violation which is controlling but
it is only the nature of the right denied which is to be con-
sidered."4
In other words, the "harmless error" doctrine cannot be invoked when
substantial federal rights are involved. On a second appeal, the United
States Supreme Court permitted the state decision to stand by denying
certiorari without comment.
In summary, the state court dissenters in these five cases, as in all
ten quasi-evasion cases," contended that the state courts had violated
the mandate of the United States Supreme Court. As Justice Becker,
joined by Justice Mason, wrote in Local 721, United Packinghouse
Workers v. Needham Packing Co. :86
[I]t would appear that every argument now used by the
majority was either implicitly or inexplicitly considered by
the United States Supreme Court and rejected. On the same
facts we now reaffirm our opposite position. I think we should
held that despite instructions to the jury to disregard the implicating statements in
determining the guilt or innocence of Bruton, admission at the joint trial of a co-
defendant's extra-judicial confession implicating Bruton violated his right to cross-
examination.
82. State v. Hopper, 253 La. 439, 218 So. 2d 551 (1969).
83. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
84. State v. Hopper, 253 La. 439, 471, 218 So. 2d 551, 562 (1969) (dissenting
opinion).
85. See note 54 supra.
86. 260 Iowa 908, 151 N.W.2d 540 (1967).
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follow the clear mandate of the court of last resort on this
matter."
Yet in each case, the adverse state court decision following the Supreme
Court remand was never reconsidered or overruled by the Supreme
Court. Although frequently the Court's mandate was narrowly con-
strued and dubiously applied, the Supreme Court accepted the volition
of the state courts and refused to grant certiorari for the second time,
partly, perhaps, as a consequence of the burdensome workload of the
high Court.
CONCLUSION
Probably the three most important findings in this study are: 1)
the increased number of "evasive" state court actions during the last
decade of the controversial Warren Court, 2) the concentration of state
court evasion and quasi-evasion in non-northern states and 3) the reluct-
ance of the Supreme Court to summarily reverse a state court decision
on first appeal. Another informative statistic is that only 7.3 percent of
the state cases which were granted certiorari and reviewed by the
Supreme Court were affirmed. It appears that the Supreme Court con-
fined its discretionary grant of certiorari to state court decisions it con-
sidered doubtful if not unconstitutional.
State court evasion of Supreme Court mandates appears to be at least
twice as high during the 1960's as in either the 1930's or the 1940's.
While eight instances of state court evasion were found in this study,
earlier studies revealed only four instances of noncompliance in the
1930's8" and no more than two examples of state court evasion in the
1940's." 9 While differences in definition may account for some disparity,
87. Id. at 926, 151 N.W.2d at 552 (dissenting opinion).
88. See Note, Final Disposition of State Decisions Reversed and Remanded by
the Supreme Court, October Term, i93 to October Term, 1941, 55 HARv. L. REv. 1357
(1942). The four "evasive" state court rulings found were: State ex rel. Anderson v.
Brand, 303 U.S. 95, on remand, 214 Ind. 356, 13 N.E.2d 955 (1938) ; Coombes Iv.
Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932), on remand, 217 Cal. 320, 18 P.2d 939 (1933) ; Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934), on remand,
189 Miss. 496, 195 So. 667 (1940); Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Decatur, 295 U.S.
165, on remand sub nom., Georgia Power Co. v. Decatur, 181 Ga. 187, 182 S.E. 32
(1935).
89. See Note, Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded to
State Courts Since 1941, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1251 (1954). The two instances of genuine
evasion were: Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, on remand, 146 Neb.
429, 19 N.W.2d 853 (1945) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), on remand
second conviction aff d by state court in unreported opinion, relvd, 327 U.S. 274 (1946).
Ashcraft was the only one of these cases argued before the Supreme Court on the merits
for a second time in which there seemed to have been a complete disregard of the Court
mandate by the state court.
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the criteria for evasive state court action used in this study appear to be
no less rigorous than the standards employed in previous studies. Surely
a state court action can be considered "evasive" if the Court's mandate
is clear and the state court judgment is twice overruled by the Supreme
Court. Given the "liberal" activism of the Supreme Court in substantive
areas and the emotional overtones of its landmark decisions, it is not
surprising that state court resistance to Supreme Court mandates in-
creased during this period of conflict and change.
Despite the rising evasion rate during the 1960's, it is worth noting
that although state court justices often disagreed with their Supreme
Court brethren, they usually complied with the Supreme Court mandate.
In 72.9 percent of the cases, the party successful at the Supreme Court
was also successful at the state level following the Court's remand. Only
3.5 percent of the Court's mandates reversing and remanding a state
court decision were ultimately evaded or quasi-evaded according to the
criteria used in this study. Thus, at a time when disunity, disobedience
and defiance persist in many aspects of intergovernmental relations, it
is refreshing to find that most state courts of last resort have an admirable
record of compliance.
As expected, the instances of state court evasion or quasi-evasion
were concentrated primarily in the South and Southwest. Only two of
the eight "evasion" cases, three of the ten "quasi-evasion" cases and 18
of the 54 cases receiving an adverse state court decision following the
Supreme Court remand came from state supreme courts in the North.
The disparity in the geographic origin of doubtful state court action may
have been a consequence of greater philosophical differences between the
Justices of the Supreme Court and members of the southern courts of
last resort. Since southern or southwestern courts accounted for eight
of the ten states with the most cases heard by the United States Supreme
Court and 11 of the 15 states having more than two cases reviewed by
the Court, the Supreme Court Justices must have considered the cases
arising from southern state courts to be the best candidates for con-
stitutional scrutiny. Since the Supreme Court accepted a disproportionate
share of cases from southern courts and reversed or vacated the judg-
ments of the state supreme courts in 92.7 percent of the cases, the
opportunity for evasion was greatest in the South. Moreover, the "con-
servative," "states' rights" South was generally more critical of the
Supreme Court's desegregation, first amendment and procedural rights
decisions than other sections of the country." Public opinion, therefore,
90. See notes 2 and 12 supra and accompanying text. For an excellent four
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may have had some influence on judicial decision-making.
Finally, the Supreme Court was very hesitant to summarily over-
rule a state supreme court without first giving the court a chance to
interpret supervening legislation, decide the constitutional issue or pro-
vide a new trial. In over two-thirds of the cases, the Supreme Court
remanded the case back to the state courts rather than reverse the state
decision outright. The Supreme Court side-stepped the constitutional
issue and remanded the case to the state courts only to have its mandate
ultimately avoided in more than a quarter of the cases which resulted in
further litigation. The wide discretion permitted in many Supreme Court
mandates allowed state supreme courts to reinstate their previous deci-
sions without technically violating the letter of the Court's command or
necessitating further review or reversal by the United States Supreme
Court. Only eight of the 54 cases in which the party successful in the
Supreme Court lost on remand in the state courts met the criteria
established for "evasive" state court action.
In conclusion, it has been the purpose of this research to examine
litigation in state cases following Supreme Court remands in an effort
to determine the magnitude of state court evasion of Court mandates.
No attempt has been made to analyze the general impact of Supreme
Court decisions, the implementation or evasion of Supreme Court man-
dates by lower federal courts or the enforcement of Supreme Court
decisions by executive bodies. While the eight instances of state court
evasion found in this study represent a disconcerting departure from
traditional compliance, on second appeal the supremacy of the Supreme
Court ultimately prevailed. It remains for future scholars to determine
the impact of evasive state court action on the dual judiciary in particu-
lar, and on the political system in general.
point rationale of why the Warren Court's image was more tainted than the New
Deal Court, see Halper, Supreme Court Responses to Congressional Threats: Strategy
and Tactics, 19 DRAKE L. REv. 292, 325 (1970).
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